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MUST CARRY AND THE COURTS: BLEAK HOUSE,
THE SEQUEL
NICHOLAS W. ALLARD*
Jarndyce andJarndyce has passed into a joke. That is the only good that
has ever come of it. It has been death to many, but it is a joke in the
profession. Every master in Chancery has had a reference out of it.
Every Chancellor was 'in it, 'for somebody or other, when he was counsel
at the bar. Good things have been said about it by blue-nosed, bulbous-
shoed old benchers, in select port-wine committee after dinner in hall.
Articled clerks have been in the habit of fleshing their legal wit upon it.
The last Lord Chancellor handled it neatly when, correcting Mr. Blow-
ers, the eminent silk gown who said that such a thing might happen
when the sky rained potatoes, he observed, 'or when we get through
Jarndyce and Jarndyce, Mr. Blowers; '--a pleasantry that particularly
tickled the maces, bags and, purses.**
The Supreme Court's inconclusive decision in Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Federal Communication Commissiona-concern-
ing the constitutionality of requiring cable television operators to
carry certain over-the-air broadcast signals2 is no more surprising
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istrative Assistant to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. A Rhodes Scholar, with degrees
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written numerous articles and is a frequent speaker on communications issues. The views
expressed in this article are those of Mr. Allard's alone and do not necessarily reflect those
of his clients or other parties. The author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Con-
stance C. LaChance and law librarian Angela D. Foley.
** CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HoUSE 4 (Oxford University Press 1991) (1853).
1 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993) (di-
recting a three-judge court to resolve material factual issues in light of Court's First
Amendment analysis).
2 Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992 [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act], inserting new §§ 614 and 615 to the Communications
Act of 1934 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535), obligate cable television systems to transmit
local commercial and noncommercial broadcast television stations. Under the 1992 Cable
Act, broadcasters may either insist on carriage ("Must Carry") or bargain for carriage ("Re-
transmission Consent"). The Must Carry language contained in §§ 4 and 5 of the 1992
Cable Act gives local commercial and noncommercial television broadcasters the right to
mandatory carriage on "cable systems" as defined for the purposes of the Communications
Act of 1934, i.e., a traditional coaxial operator, but not, for example, other multichannel
video distributors employing microwave or satellite technology. The Retransmission Con-
sent language in § 6 of the 1992 Cable Act prohibits cable operators and other multichan-
nel distributors from carrying television stations' signals without first obtaining the
broadcaster's consent. The provisions are interrelated because, once effective, broadcast-
ers on a system-by-system basis must opt every three years between the Must Carry and
Retransmission Consent regulatory regimes. If a broadcaster selects Must Carry, local
cable systems must retransmit the broadcaster's signal (at no cost to either party). If a
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than the litigation the decision addresses.' Rather, Turner is just
another indecisive battle in what could become the hundred years
legal war among contending broadcast and cable rivals in the tele-
vision marketplace. Despite all the Sturm und Drang over Must
Carry4 and other controversial provisions of the 1992 Cable Act,5
broadcaster selects Retransmission Consent, or if the multichannel distributer is not sub-
ject to Must Carry, a negotiated agreement between the broadcaster and the multichannel
distributor governs the retransmission rights. For a comprehensive analysis of the Must
Carry law, including a reprise of its evolution, see Gary S. Lutzker, The 1992 Cable Act and
the First Amendment: What Must, Must Not, and May Not Be Carried, 12 CARDozo ARTS & Er.
LJ. 467 (1994); the legislative history is reviewed in Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act:
Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & Ewr. L.J. 305, 307-11 (1993).
3 Congress expected the constitutional challenge in Turner. Indeed, the certainty of
litigation on this subject prompted an exceptionally extensive preemptive defense of the
new statutory provisions in the legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act. See S. REP. No. 92,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 53-62 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 58-74 (1992).
Congress, due to the expected challenge, provided for streamlined judicial review for Must
Carry by a three-judge district court panel and direct review by the Supreme Court. 1992
Cable Act § 23 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1)).
4 Turner Broadcasting System ("TBS") filed the Turner complaint the morning after
Congress's late-night vote to enact the 1992 Cable Act, overriding President Bush's veto.
Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, No. 92-2247 (D.D.C. Oct. 5,1992) (challenging the consti-
tutionality of §§ 4, 5 and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act). In its amended complaint, filed Nov. 5,
1992, TBS was joined as plaintiff by several other cable program network owners: Arts &
Entertainment Network, Black Entertainment Television, E! Entertainment Television,
Hearst/ABC-Viacom Entertainment Services, International Family Entertainment, Na-
tional Cable Satellite Corp., QVC Network, The Travel Channel, and USA Networks.
5 Turner is one of five lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of fourteen different
sections of the Act filed within days of enactment. See Discovery Comm. v. United States,
No. 92-2558 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1992) (challenging §§ 3, 9, and 19 of the 1992 Cable Act);
National Cable TV Ass'n v. United States, No. 92-2495 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1992) (challenging§§ 4, 5, and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act); Time Warner Ent. Co. v. FCC, No. 92-2494 (D.D.C.
Nov. 5, 1992) (challenging §§ 3, 7(b)(4)(B), 7(c), 9, 10(d), 11, 15, 19, 24, and 25 of the
1992 Cable Act); Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, No. 92-2292 (D.D.C. Oct. 13,
1992) (challenging the constitutionality of §§ 4, 5, and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act); Turner
Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, No. 92-2247 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1992) (challenging the constitutional-
ity of §§ 4, 5, and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act).
All the plaintiffs challenged §§ 4 and 5, the Must Carry provisions. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534,
535. All five cases were consolidated as related cases. Thereafter, all the Must Carry claims
were severed for hearing, as the statute requires, by a three-judge district court. Id. § 555;
see Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1992); Time Warner Ent.
Co., L.P. v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 1302 (D.D.C. 1992) (denying preliminary relief). The three-
judge district court, in a divided decision, upheld the Must Carry provisions. Turner
Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), application denied, 113 S. Ct. 1806
(1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., as CircuitJustice) (refusing to enjoin enforcement of §§ 4 and 5
of the 1992 Cable Act).
The constitutionality of ten other provisions including the controversial new rate regu-
lation provisions of the 1992 Cable Act upheld when the remaining claims were decided in
Daniels Cablevision v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993) (Jackson,J.) (upholding 10
sections of the 1992 Cable Act, overturning cable multisystem operator ("MSO") owner-
ship limits, public service obligations for direct broadcast satellite and notice requirements
for cable previews contained in §§ 11(c), 15, 25 of the 1992 Cable Act respectively), cert.
granted sub nom. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct.
2445 (1994). For other challenges to the 1992 Cable Act, see e.g., Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (indecency provisions and associated FCC
rules); Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (indecency
provisions, remanded to FCC).
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Turner is but the latest droning chapter of a uniquely American
version of Jarndyce and Jarndyce. For, like the often tortured his-
tory of Must Carry rules, Turner itself is procedurally6 and substan-
tively7 complex.
Writing in the August 1853 preface to the first edition of Bleak
House, Charles Dickens described his inspiration for the fictional
Jarndyce and Jarndyce:
At the present moment there is a suit before the Court which
was commenced nearly twenty years ago; in which from thirty to
forty counsel have been known to appear at one time; in which
costs have been incurred to the amount of seventy thousand
6 For example, the briefing schedule and oral argument were delayed because the
Justice Department under the outgoing Bush Administration initially indicated that it
would not defend against the Must Carry challenges. The basis for this position was pre-
sumably that the Department had concluded that the Must Carry provision was unconstitu-
tional and had advised the President to veto the legislation. Upon the motion of several
parties, and with Congress, which had adjourned sine die at the close of the 102d Congress,
procedurally unable to defend the statute itself until it reconvened and could formally
approve such participation in the litigation, the court postponed hearing the merits of the
case. Under the Clinton Administration, the Justice Department reversed its position and
filed a brief defending Must Carry. The day before the Justice Department entered the
case, the Senate passed a resolution to file an amicus curiae brief in defense of Must Carry.
139 CONG. REc. S1145-46 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993).
7 The Court shrouds its analysis and minimizes the possible precedential impact of
Turner in a mind spinning array of different line-ups ofjustices concurring and dissenting
in various different parts of the decision. Abbott & Costello's most famous routine may be
easier to follow:
KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opin-
ion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part I, the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts II-A and II-B, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BLACKMUN,
O'CONNOR, SCALIA, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, the
opinion of the Court with respects to Parts II-C, I1-D, and III-A, in which REHN-
QUIST, CJ., and BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and SOUTER, B., joined, and an
opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which REHNQUIST, CJ., and BLACK-
MUN and SOUTER, _U., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which SCALIA and GINSBURG, Z., joined, and in Parts I and III of
which THOMAS,J.,joined. GINSBURG,J., filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
114 S. Ct. at 2450-51 ("JUSTICE STEVENS, though favoring affirmance, concurred in the
judgment because otherwise no disposition of the case would be supported by five Justices
and because he is in substantial agreement with JUSTICE KENNEDY's analysis of this
case."); cf Who's on First? on HEY, ABBoTrl (Jim Gates, Director 1978 Video) reviewed in MIcK
MARTIN & MARSHA PORTER, VIDEO MOVIE GuIDE 1991, at 271 (Ballantine Books 1991). It
seems that Turner is part of a trend toward fragmented judicial opinions, a result observed
particularly frequently in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. This
kind of decision is problematic because its outcome is hardly dispositive and has little fu-
ture significance beyond the narrow confines the fragile consensus suggests, despite the
magnitude of the stakes and the importance of the issues. Perhaps with a smaller caseload,
the Court will be able to work toward broader accommodation and consensus in individual
cases. See also Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Justices Open Their New Session By Refusing Cases, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1994, at Al; Joan Biskupic, Justices Take No New Cases As Term Starts, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 1994, at Al; Not Just Another First Monday, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 4, 1994, at A20.
Hopefully, the prospect of less material over which to disagree will not deepen divisions.
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pounds; ... and which is (I am assured) no nearer to its termi-
nation now than when it was begun.
8
Must Carry litigation might have moved Dickens to write a multi-
volume sequel. For over three decades, the cable and broadcast
television industries have waged a war on several legal fronts, over
the rules governing a cable operator's ability to receive and retrans-
mit broadcast signals by wire.9 For years there have been interre-
lated battles over the retransmission of broadcast signals in the
FCC, the courts, and Congress concerning Must Carry,"° Syndi-
cated Exclusivity, and Nonduplication rules,1" as well as closely re-
8 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE Xiii (Oxford University Press 1991) (1853).
9 See generally Lutzker, supra note 2; Mark A. Conrad, The Saga of Cable TV's "Must-Carry"
Rules: Will A New Phoenix Rise from the Constitutional Ashes?, 10 PACE L. REv. 9 (1990).
10 The FCC first instituted Must Carry obligations in 1962 when it required cable sys-
tems to carry local broadcast signals as a condition of a microwave license to a rural cable
system. See Carter Mtn. Transmission v. FCC, 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd., 321 F.2d 359
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). This policy evolved into the requirement that
all cable system operators transmit to their subscribers, upon request and without compen-
sation, every over-the-air broadcast signal that was "significantly viewed in the community"
or otherwise that the FCC considered local. See Rules Re Microwave-Served CATV, First
Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965); CATV, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725
(1966); Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia invalidated the FCC's long-standing
Must Carry rules, ruling that they violated cable operators' First Amendment rights.
Quincy Cable Television, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986). Although the court ruled that the existing Must Carry rules were unconstitu-
tional, it did not hold that Must Carry was per se unconstitutional. The FCC refashioned
the Must Carry rules. These scaled-back Must Carry rules limited the number of broadcast
stations a cable system was required to carry, established a minimum viewership standard
for stations to be eligible for carriage, permitted cable systems to refuse carriage of more
than one broadcast station affiliated with the same commercial broadcast network, and
limited the number of noncommercial stations a cable system was required to carry. The
rules were to be effective for five years and then were to be eliminated entirely. In re
Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television
Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, Report and Order, I F.C.C.R. 864, 889
(1986). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia again struck down the Must
Carry rules as unconstitutional. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292
(D.C. Cir. 1987), order clarified, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
The court concluded that the FCC had not demonstrated a substantial governmental inter-
est in some aspects of the rules to satisfy First Amendment requirements and that, in any
event, the rules were overly broad.
The Must Carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act are the first legislative attempt since
Century Communications to construct a set of Must Carry rules that can survive judicial scru-
tiny. After the Quincy and Century decisions, the FCC opened another Must Carry inquiry,
which it closed in light of the 1992 Cable Act. See Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545, 4564, 1 99 (1991).
11 The FCC promulgated Syndicated Exclusivity ("Syndex") and Nonduplication rules
concurrently with its Must Carry rules. These rules protected a local broadcaster from the
importation of both syndicated and network programs that duplicated programming to
which the broadcaster had purchased exclusive rights. See 38 F.C.C. at 741-66; 2 F.C.C. at
803-04 (requiring all cable systems to give notice before importing any distant signal). The
FCC eliminated Syndex in 1980 but retained network exclusivity. CATV Syndicated Exclu-
sivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980); see Syndicated Programs Exclusivity and Sports Tele-
casts, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 625 (July 13, 1984) (denying broadcaster's petition to
reconsider). Subsequently, the FCC reinstated syndex and expanded network and duplica-
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lated copyright issues1 2 and the cable compulsory license created
in the Copyright Act of 1976.'1 Now that the knot of interwoven
disputes within the television family has become what some un-
tion rules. In re Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Program Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industries, 3 F.C.C.R. 5299 (1988), on reh,
4 F.C.C.R. 2711 (1989) (rules codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-.163 (syndicated exclusivity);
47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-.97 (1992) (non-duplication); 47 C.F.R. § 76.67 (sports broadcasts)).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the reinstated rule in United
Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The rules remain in effect to this day.
12 Cable retransmission began to come to a head as a copyright issue in 1965. See REGIs-
TER OF CoPYRiGHTs, THE LIBRARv OF CONGRESS, CABLE AND SATELLITE CARRIER COMPULSORY
LICENSES: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYsis, at 7 (Mar. 1992) [hereinafter CoPRmGHT OFFICE RE-
PORT]. In hearings before a House Judiciary Subcommittee, broadcasters argued for full
copyright liability for cable retransmission of broadcast signals. Id. Around the same time,
the FCC initiated its role as the regulator of cable television by implementing the first Must
Carry rules. These rules required cable system operators to transmit to their subscribers,
upon request and without compensation, every over-the-air broadcast signal that was "sig-
nificantly viewed in the community" or otherwise considered local by the FCC.
As the copyright debate continued in Congress, the Supreme Court handed down two
important cases impacting the retransmission issue. The first case established the FCC's
authority over the cable industry. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968); see also CoPYRIGrr OFFICE REPORT, supra, at 10. In the second case, the Supreme
Court held that cable retransmission of local broadcast signals was wholly outside the copy-
right laws. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artist Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see also
CoPvRGrr OFFICE REPORT, supra, at 11. In 1974, the Supreme Court held that cable sys-
tems were not liable under copyright laws for retransmitting either distant or imported
signals. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); see also
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra, at 21-23. The Teleprompter and Fortnightly decisions com-
pleted the absolution of copyright liability for cable retransmission.
The ebb and flow of broadcast Must Carry and Retransmission rights has been in a
cycle with copyright developments. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. H6505 (daily ed. July 23,
1992) (remarks of Rep. William J. Hughes, Chairman, House Intellectual Property Sub-
committee) ("Make no mistake, retransmission consent is nothing more than a copyright
in sheep's clothing. The U.S. copyright office has agreed, stating that retransmission alters
the fundamental principle of the compulsory licensing scheme."); see also Daniels, 835 F.
Supp. at 12 (noting it is not constitutionally significant that Congress "has done in the
Cable Act what it otherwise could have done in the Copyright Act").
13 In 1976, Congress amended the 1909 Copyright Act and established a licensing sys-
tem for cable retransmission. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119 (1976 & Supp. 1992) (Cable systems
are permitted to make secondary transmissions of copyrighted works contingent on the
filing of certain notices and statements and the payment of certain fees. The program was
developed as a means of accommodating two sometimes conflicting federal policies: ensur-
ing the broad public dissemination of broadcast programs, while at the same time protect-
ing the rights of owners of copyrighted materials). The thrust of the new licensing
scheme, called compulsory licensing, was to guarantee cable operators the right to conduct
their business free from the threat of liability as long as they complied with FCC regula-
tions and paid their proper royalties. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 12, at 24.
Cable systems were allowed to carry local signals at no charge, but had to pay royalties for
retransmitting distant signals. The statutory compulsory licensing system attempted to bal-
ance the competing interests of copyright holders with those of the cable operators, or any
other operator retransmitting their work, by allowing them to retransmit works from
broadcasters without having to negotiate with the copyright holder of each work. Id. at 23-
24; see Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-369, 108 Stat. 3477 (1994) (ex-
tending satellite compulsory license contained in § 119 through December 31, 1999, and
clarifying that microwave or so-called wireless cable transmissions are entitled to the § 111
cable compulsory license). See H.R. REP. No. 2406, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) and ac-
companying floor statements on the day it passed the Senate, 140 CONG. REc. S1404-06
(daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) and on the day it passed the House of Representatives, 140 CONG.
REc. H9268-72 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994).
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charitably describe as a fight between the rich and the very wealthy,
the controversy has the fuel for extended travel through the legal
apparatus, no matter what the courts ultimately determine regard-
ing the First Amendment issues raised in Turner.14
Perhaps Turner's essential significance and the greatest cause
of concern, is it demonstrates that the Court has yet to develop a
coherent First Amendment analysis for electronic speech that
moves beyond outmoded and naive views of technology and the
telecommunications market.' 5 The immediate heirs of this legacy
of inbred constitutional analysis are the related cases now pending
appeal that challenge the constitutionality of virtually all the other
sections of the 1992 Cable Act, 6 as well as the several recent cases
involving local Bell telephone operating companies' efforts to lift
to the current statutory ban on offering video services within their
service areas in competition with local cable television compa-
nies." Actually, the issues raised in Turner implicate virtually every
regulation that currently divides different communications busi-
nesses into separately regulated media fiefdoms. 18 In addition,
Congress may already have begun siring the next generation of liti-
gation, as extraordinarily defensive portions of the legislative his-
tory of landmark telecommunications legislation-stillborn in the
14 Billions' are at stake. Total 1992 revenues for broadcasters exceeded $25 billion and
for cable exceeded $21 billion. James K. Glassman, Big Money: Disconnecting the Competition,
WASi.. PosT, Sept. 28, 1994, at Fl.
15 See J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications: Unleashing the Industry, AM. ENTERPRISE,
Sept./Oct. 1994, at 41 (calling the "inferior protection that the Supreme Court has af-
forded electronic speech ... one of the great embarrassments of contemporary constitu-
tional jurisprudence" and arguing that electronic speech conveyed by telecommunications
deserves as much protection under the First Amendment as newspapers). Compare the
approach of Phillip H. Miller, Note, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amend-
ment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FoRDuAM L. REv. 1147 (1993), who would
elevate electronic speech to full First Amendment protection afforded newspapers and
thereby analogize new media technology to existing regulatory models, with other criti-
cisms of the existing hierarchical First Amendment distinctions among different media
that propose alternative technology neutral First Amendment models. See Note, The
Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. REv.
1062 (1994) [hereinafter Message in the Medium]; Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the
Freedom of Expression, 1988 DuKE LJ. 329; Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-Part
1: Why Can't Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. Rv. 212 (1987); see also Laurence
H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Fron-
tier, Keynote Address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (Mar.
26, 1991) (transcript available in Harvard Law School Library).
16 See supra note 5.
17 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994); BellSouth v.
United States, No. CV 93B2661-S (N.D. Ala, Sept. 23, 1994); see Charles Haddad, BellSouth
Wins Key Victory in Cable Push, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Sept. 24, 1994, at BI; COMM. DAILY,
Sept. 27, 1994, at 5; Dennis Wharton, Alabama Judge OKs BellSouth Cable Entry, VARIETY, Oct.
9, 1994, at 50.
18 See Michael Schrage, In the Emerging Multimedia Age, The 1st Amendment Must Come
First, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1994, at B3.
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103rd Congress, and likely to be reborn in the 104th Congress-
self-consciously betrays. 19 Another contest over the standards for
the gateway technology now contained in set-top boxes20 is being
played quietly by inside-the-beltway rules for back room deals, but
it has the potential to spill out into the biggest bare knuckle First
Amendment brawl of all because it will determine who controls the
flow of information into the home.
Ultimately, Turner will not dramatically or lastingly influence
the market relationships among broadcast and cable television,
even with respect to the fundamental issue of whether cable con-
tinues to be a major outlet for broadcast programming. After all,
the Must Carry and especially the Retransmission Consent statutory
provisions themselves have been something of a fizzle in terms of
shaping the marketplace.22 Rather, the accelerating technological
19 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTA-
TION ON S. 1822, S. REP. No. 367, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-16, 40-46 (1994) (section by
section analysis laboring to justify proposed public access provisions that would require all
"telecommunications networks"-broadly defined-to make five percent of their capacity
available at preferential rates to qualified public interest entities, including educational
institutions and § 501 (c) (3) organizations). The analysis specifically addresses and antici-
pates challenges that could be raised under Turner. Comparable set asides for direct
broadcast satellite contained in § 25 of the 1992 Cable Act were overturned in the related
consolidated cases and are now on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia. Daniels Cablevision v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993). The set aside
requirements in S. 1822 can be traced to a bill introduced by Senator Daniel Inouye, The
National Public Telecommunications Infrastructure Act of 1994,.S. 2195, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994), which proposed setting aside twenty percent of network capacity for use of
public entities at no charge. See 140 CONG. REC. S6942 (daily ed; June '15, 1994) (remarks
of Sen. Inouye). Although the new Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Sena-
tor Larry Pressler, indicates he intends to reintroduce telecomm reform legislation along
largely nonpartisan lines early in the 104th Congress, he has predicted that the five percent
set aside would be stripped out of any future Senate bill. See Senator Larry Pressler, Re-
marks before 12th Annual Private and Wireless Cable Show (Nov. 13, 1994) (transcript on
file with Senator Pressler's office).
20 Set-top boxes are the computer controlled switching devices that will sit atop televi-
sions and function as the software operating system for the advanced interactive mul-
timedia services soon to be available over cable. The industry battle concerns the extent to
which the government will be involved in setting standards for the boxes' underlying
software and communications protocols. Several companies and organizations are con-
cerned that if one or two companies control the standards, they may have an unfair advan-
tage in developing content. See, e.g., John Markoff, Microsoft Organizes Its Interactive TV
Team, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at D6; Don Clark, Microsoft Adds 10 Partners, Discloses Plans
for New Interactive-TV Software, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1994, at B8.
21 See Elizabeth Corcoran, A 'Battle of the Box' is Brewing, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at
DI.
22 Trade press accounts generally described the impact of retransmission consent as
anti-climactic. See, e.g., Joe Flint, Stations Stay for No Pay: TV Stations Prefer Barter Deals Over
Cash in Retransmission-Consent Deals, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 11, 1993, at 6; Rachel W.
Thompson, Consent Wars Over, But Who Won What?, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 11, 1993, at
1; Linda Moss, October 6 Was No Doomsday, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 11, 1993, at 14; Rich
Brown, Few Stations Have Retrans Coverage Gaps, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 1, 1993, at 14;
Cablers Cut Only 4 Percent of Stations, HOLLvWOOD REP., Oct. 28, 1993; Retransmission Consent
Truces Declared, TELEVISION DIGEST, Oct. 11, 1993; 95% Unaffected: Some Heated Retransmis-
sion Consent Skirmishes Emerge, But Most Are Settled, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 10, 1993, at 1; Noel
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change and the rapid evolution and explosive growth of informa-
tion age businesses will determine the market. Courts are not well
suited to keep apace with the dramatic technological changes in
the telecommunications industry."3 For example, the ability to in-
crease channel capacity through fiber optic cable and other inno-
vations could be expected to create new incentives for increasingly
program hungry cable operators to carry broadcast channels. Up-
coming FCC video dialtone decisions, which could authorize the
telephone companies to offer competing video service, including
transmission of broadcast signals,24 and the indirect consequences
of the FCC's cable rate regulations25 are also both likely to have a
Holston, Key Deadline in TV Industry Passes with Hardly a Glitch, STAR TRIB., Oct. 7, 1993, at
2B; CBS Winds Down Retransmission Consent Fight, TELEvjSIdN DIGEST, Oct. 4, 1993. The tone
of this coverage in the trade press generally is consistent with a sample of several hundred
news articles from across the country the author found in a NEXIS search.
There were, however, some hot spots, which apparently are the exception rather than
the rule. See, e.g., Rachel W. Thompson, Embers Still Burning from Texas to Maine, MUL-
TICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 11, 1993, at 60; Rachel W. Thompson, Little Retransmission Consent
Progress in S.F. Suburb, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 15, 1993, at 18.
Must Carry's most controversial impact has been some cable operators' apparent deci-
sion to drop C-Span to make room for other programming for a variety of reasons. See
TimothyJ. Burger, Less Congress on Cable, C-Span Warns; 1.5 Million Feel Cutbacks After Cable
Big, ROLL CALL, Sept. 9, 1993, at 10;Jane Hall, Fx Affects C-Span's Viewership, L.A. TIMES, May
30, 1994, at 1; Christopher Stern, Fx Factor: C-Span Minus 200,000 Subs; Cable Systems Drop
Public Affairs Channels for New Fox Network, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 9, 1994, at 53; see
also Michael Applebaum, Now You C-Span, Now You Don't, Spy, Sept./Oct. 1994, at 77.
23 The courts themselves seem to acknowledge this point. See, e.g., Fortnightly, 392 U.S.
at 402 ("With due regard to changing technology, we hold that the petitioner did not
under that law 'perform' the respondent's copyrighted works."); Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at
414 (following Fortnightly, but noting that "[d] etailed regulation of these relationships, and
any ultimate resolution of the many sensitive and important problems in this field, must be
left to Congress.") (footnote omitted); see also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v.
United States, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. June 15, 1994) (The Fourth Circuit refused to review a
decision invalidating the 1984 Cable Act's cross-ownership restriction barring telephone
company entry into cable business. The court "places this case in abeyance pending [fur-
ther] congressional action possible on repeal of 47 U.S.C. § 533(b). The parties are di-
rected to inform the Court immediately, in writing of any legislative action on the
matter."). In the intellectual property context, a government "Green Paper" recently ad-
dressed the difficulty of courts' stretching copyright laws to fit rapidly changing technol-
ogy. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (July 1994); see, e.g., Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) and Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F.
Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (courts seemed unable to decide whether unauthorized trans-
mission of copyrighted work via the Internet infringes the copyright holder's distributor
rights or reproduction rights); see also Tribe, supra note 15 (regarding the Court's difficulty
with technology).
24 See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-
63.58, Mem. Op. and Order on Recons. and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, No. 87-266 (released Nov. 7, 1994); Second Report and Order, Recommendation to
Congress, and Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992). Simply
put, if low cost broadcast signals are available to viewers from an alternative subscription
service offered by telephone companies, cable companies that fail to carry such signals will
do so at their own risk.
25 See 47 C.F.R. § 76.100.621 (1994); see also In re Implementation of Sections of the
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large impact on the actual carriage of broadcast signals by cable
regardless of the ultimate resolution of Turner.
Meanwhile, while waiting for a crumb of amusement to fall
from the Must Carry litigation, which was squeezed dry years upon
years ago, and with the certainty that the American cousins of Dick-
ens' barrister Mr. Tangle will press on into the future in pursuit of
adjudicated truth, the economic performance of both the broad-
casting and cable television sectors appears quite disconnected
from the cause at hand in Turner. Broadcasters are gearing up for
the best season in recent memory.26 Broadcast revenues and sta-
tion values are rebounding 27 and advertising revenues are increas-
ing.28 The cable business also is growing.29 Cable advertising
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 510 (1992) (amended by Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 5631 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76), aff'd, First
Order on Reconsideration, Second Report and Order, and Third Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,718 (1993) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76)). By control-
ling what cable operators can charge for the programming they carry and how much they
can mark-up new programming for profit, the new rate regulations impact on program
line-up choices. Rate regulations create additional incentives for cable operators to carry
popular low cost programs such as broadcast programming. Soon the FCC will modify the
pricing constraints to increase incentives for cable operators to expand offerings with new
programming. See Edmund L. Andrews, Looser Cable Pricing Rules Weighed to Spur Investment,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1994, at 39; A WindowforNew Cable TVFare, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,1994, at
C6. For a provocative analysis of the impact of rate regulation on what programming cable
operators carry, see THOMAS W. HAZLETr, REGULATORY CABLE TELEVISION RATES: AN Eco-
NOMiC ANALYSIS (July 1994) (Working Paper No. 3 Institute of Government Affairs, U.C.
Davis).
26 FCC Chairman, Reed E. Hundt, Remarks before the Broadcasting and Cable Inter-
face VIII (Oct. 4, 1994); Julie Zier, Economic Forecast: Blue Skies Ahead, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Oct. 10, 1994, at 27; Paul Farhi, Advertisers, Suitors Zoom In on TV Networks, WASH.
POST, Oct. 31, 1994, at Al.
27 Hundt, supra note 26; see also Geoffrey Foisie, ABC, CBS Tie for TV Network 1993 Reve-
nue Honors, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 16, 1994, at 6; Migration to Digital-Part 3: Awaken-
ing to a New Era, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 16, 1994, at S3 (broadcast networks are
rebounding in audience share; revenues are headed upwards once again) (citing TV exec-
utive Harold Simpson: COMM. DAILY, Aug. 17, 1994, at 3 (If revenue growth rates continue,
'we could see the first double-digit (growth] year since 1984." (quoting Goldman Sachs
media analyst Barry Kaplan in Warren Getler, Media Deals Expected to Trickle Down, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 6, 1994, at C1 ("TV is back in vogue. The pace of the business has improved ....
[T] here's growing appreciation for the robust cash-flow capabilities of successful television
and radio companies .... ")))); Elizabeth Jenner, Still Kicking, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1994, at
B3 ("In the past year, Wall Street analysts have upgraded their opinions of network stocks
to reflect strong operating results .... As a result, broadcast stocks have soared.")
28 Hundt, supra note 26; Alan Breznick, Upfront '94 Wrapup, Cable Clears 1B Mark for First
Time, but Broadcast is No Slouch, CABLE WORLD, Aug. 29, 1994, at 40, (quoting ad executive
Paul Schulman, in Bill Carter, Ad Bonanza Has Networks Feeling Flush, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
1994, at 33 ("I haven't seen a network market like this in 15 years .... [E]verything is
hot.")); RAB reports average 9% revenue gain, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 12, 1994, at 41.
29 Hundt, supra note 26 (noting that cable growth rate for top fifty MSOs has increased
from 2.6% in 1992 to 3%, accelerating 13.3% in the last year). Recent acquisitions have
been at multiples of eleven times cash flow. Id.; John M. Higgins, Re-Reg Credited for Helping
Subs Gains, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 1.
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revenues are rising,30 subscription and subscriber levels continue
to increase,3 1 and projected revenues per subscriber also are mov-
ing up.3
2
The Must Carry rules challenged in Turner closely resemble
the rules determined to be unconstitutional in Century Communica-
tions v. FCC.3  The Turner plaintiffs argued that Must Carry is an
impermissible restraint on their free speech rights because it forces
cable operators to use some of their finite channel capacity to carry
competing "speakers" (broadcasters), while leaving cable operators
with fewer channels to carry programming of their choice. In this
way, the plaintiffs asserted, Must Carry inhibits cable operators' edi-
torial discretion to determine which programming to deliver to
30 Paul Kagan Associates, Inc. projects the 1994-95 up-front ad market to be $1.07 bil-
lion, a 19% increase over the 1993-94 $895 million. Breznick, supra note 28, at 40.
31 See Hundt, supra note 26 (according to the National Cable Television Association,
the number of subscribers rose from 57.2 million in 1992 to 58.8 million in 1994);John M.
Higgins, Some Rates Rising, Many Ops Hold Back, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 19, 1994, at 3;
COMM. DAILY, Apr. 20, 1994, at 1 (Based on data collected for Warren Publishing's Cable &
TVFact Book: for the top fifty MSOs, which have about 85% of all subscribers, growth rates
averaged about 5% for the twelve months ending March 1994, most of which is due to
merger/acquisitions. Without mergers and acquisitions, the growth rate is only about 3%,
but industry-wide growth for 1992 (the last pre-regulation year) was 2.6%.).
32 Recently reported, Paul Kagan Associates, Inc. which initially predicted that average
monthly revenue per subscriber would rise from $29.76 in 1994 to $46.05 in 2000 has now
boosted that projection to $47.74.
33 835 F.2d at 293. In fact, cable operators and program suppliers have argued that
they are more restrictive and less narrowly tailored. See Mem. of Points and Authorities in
Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 36, Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32
(D.D.C. 1993) (No. 92-2247).
Under § 4 of the 1992 Cable Act, cable systems with more than twelve usable activated
channels must allocate up to one-third of such channels for the carriage of local commer-
cial stations, while systems with twelve or fewer usable activated channels are required to
carry the signals of at least three local commercial stations. Cable systems with fewer than
300 subscribers are exempt from the Must Carry rules, so long as they do not delete from
carriage any broadcast television station's signal. 1992 Cable Act § 614(b) (1). If the
number of local commercial stations exceeds the number of channels that the system is
required to allocate, the 1992 Cable Act allows the system operator, with some exceptions,
discretion in selecting which of these stations shall be carried on its system. § 614(b) (2).
Section 5 of the 1992 Cable Act describes the cable operators' non-commercial educa-
tional ("NCE") Must Carry obligations. § 615 (inserting a new section into the Communi-
cations Act of 1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 535). The 1992 Cable Act defines NCE as (1)
a station licensed by the FCC as an NCE that is owned by either a public agency or non-
profit entity and that is eligible for grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting; or
(2) a municipally owned and operated station that transmits primarily non-commercial
programs for educational purposes. § 615(1)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 535(1)(1)). Sys-
tems with a capacity of greater than thirty-six channels are required to carry every NCE that
requests carriage, unless its programming is substantially duplicated by another station on
the system. Systems with twelve or fewer channels must carry one qualified NCE, while
those with between thirteen and thirty-six channels must carry either one, two, or three
NCEs. § 615(b). As with the commercial Must Carry provisions, system operators are re-
quired to carry the station's entire broadcast schedule, and are prohibited from accepting
compensation for such carriage. In addition, every NCE Must Carry station may elect
either its current broadcast channel position or the channel position it occupied prior to
July 19, 1985. § 615(g) (5).
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their customers. Plaintiffs also argued that Must Carry violates the
First Amendment because it elevates broadcasters to a preferred
status not afforded to other non-broadcast programmers by guar-
anteeing broadcasters access to cable channels.34 The district
court panel below, however, upheld Must Carry, granted the Gov-
ernment summary judgment, and dismissed the Turner plaintiffs'
claims,35 ruling that Congress merely had "employed its regulatory
powers over the economy to impose order upon a market in
dysfunction. 36
Judge Jackson's majority opinion applied the same O'Brien37
standard the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
used in Centuryj8 to overturn the earlier version of Must Carry, but
reached a different result. Rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that
Must Carry amounted to content-based regulation warranting
"strict scrutiny," the panel sustained the rules under the intermedi-
ate O'Brien First Amendment standard.39 The district court ruled
that the preservation of local broadcasting is an important govern-
ment interest and that the must-carry provisions are sufficiently tai-
lored to serve that interest.40 Distinguishing both Quincy and
Century on the basis that in those previous cases the FCC had not
established an adequate record,4" the Turner majority found that
Congress had built a record sufficient to justify the rule and, in the
absence of any material facts in dispute, granted summary
judgment.42
The Supreme Court disagreed, deciding that the panel below
had applied the correct test 43 but had made insufficient factual
findings on the record to warrant granting summary judgment.44
In its complex ruling, the Court vacated the district court panel
34 See Judge Jackson's analysis of these two assertions in Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 41 n.18.
There are many ironies in the various arguments.
35 819 F. Supp. at 40, 47, 51. All three judges wrote opinions, Judge Sporkin concur-
ring in Judge Jackson's majority opinion, and Judge Williams dissenting. Id. at 51, 57.
36 Id. at 40. Must Carry is "essentially economic regulation designed to create competi-
tive balance in the video industry as a whole, and to redress the effects of cable operators'
anti-competitive practices." Id
37 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (The Court established an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny when reviewing government regulations primarily aimed at "non-
speech" conduct that restrict First Amendment freedoms. Under the intermediate
standard, the regulation must further an important or substantial government interest that
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the incidental restriction on free
expression must be no greater than essential to further that interest.).
38 Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d at 298-304.
39 819 F. Supp. at 42-45.
40 Id. at 45-47.
41 Id. at 41.
42 Id. at 47, 51 (Sporkin, J., concurring).
43 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
44 Id. at 2472.
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decision upholding Must Carry, remanded the case back to the
panel for further factual findings, and instructed the court to (1)
determine whether Must Carry is necessary to preserve the viability
of the local broadcast industry and (2) examine the effect Must
Carry has had on cable program networks and operators.45
Each side could find some good news in the result. For cable
and cable programmers, eight out of nine justices apparently
found that the Must Carry rules had not been justified factually,
questioned whether the broadcasters' business is in jeopardy, and
queried whether Must Carry was an appropriate solution if such a
problem exists. 46 For broadcasters, the Court did not hold Must
Carry rules to be unconstitutional; in fact, Turner demonstrates
that, given an adequate record, Must Carry could be constitu-
tional. 47  Additionally, Must Carry remains effective pending a fi-
nal resolution of this long case. Finally, the Court remanded the
case to the panel that already upheld Must Carry.4 s
Turner may be more noteworthy for what it did not do than for
what it accomplished. The Court declined the opportunity to reex-
amine the validity of the "scarcity rationale," which it long has held
to justify more intrusive regulation of broadcasting than of other
media.49 The scarcity rationale focuses on the physical characteris-
tics of the microwave spectrum that determine the availability and
ability to use microwave frequencies to broadcast signals. The
Court's discussion of the technical differences between broadcast
and cable and of advances in communications technology is sim-
plistic and unconvincing, if not just wrong.5 ° The technology-spe-
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. Indeed, both Judges Jackson's and Sporkin's defense of the Must Carry law were
quite vigorous. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 40-44, 53-57.
49 According to the spectrum scarcity rationale, because demand for space on the
broadcast spectrum is greater than the supply, licensees serve as "proxies or fiduciaries
with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of [their] com-
munity." Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). "Where there are sub-
stantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it
is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the
right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Id. at 388. Courts are much less
willing to permit government regulation of other media in which the problem of spectrum
scarcity does not exist.
Compare Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding that the fairness doctrine, requiring
broadcasters to provide a free opportunity to respond to personal attacks, did not violate
the First Amendment); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984);
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding FCC rules prohibiting radio licen-
sees from entering restrictive contracts with national networks) with Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding Florida law mandating a right to equal
space for a political candidate to answer newspaper criticism and attacks on his or her
record violated the First Amendment).
50 The Court explains:
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cific, scarcity based approach oddly suggests that First Amendment
protection rises or falls with innovations that increase or impede
the traffic that can travel on any of the five lanes of the information
superhighway - broadcast, cable, wireline telephone, cellular tele-
phone, and satellite - or vary with the multiplying number of
users and new computer applications of the various communica-
tions delivery systems. Like the awkward common law classifica-
tions of trespassers, licensees, and invitees once used to determine
landowner's tort liability, rigid categories that courts belatedly re-
placed with general negligence principles better suited to the cir-
cumstances of modern life," the technology-specific, scarcity
approach is bound to yield convoluted reasoning and peculiar re-
sults. 52 Should a rural "mom and pop" cable system with limited
channel capacity and unable to finance the upgrade to fiber optic
technology be entitled to less First Amendment protection than a
well financed multi-system cable operator that can offer its sub-
scribers one hundred or more channels of programming? Should
a communications company's First Amendment status hinge on
whether or not it elects to invest in technology upgrades that in-
crease the amount of information it can transmit? For First
Amendment purposes, does scarcity of delivery capacity provide
any compelling reason to afford different First Amendment status
to various providers of multichannel video services: coaxial cable
services; fiber optic cable services; video services delivered over tel-
ephone lines; microwave subscription television services, known
popularly as "wireless cable" television that can deliver up to thirty-
[t] he broadcast cases are inapposite in the present context because cable televi-
sion does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the broad-
cast medium. Indeed, given the rapid advances in fiber optics and digital
compression technology, soon there may be no practical limitation on the
number of speakers who may use the cable medium. Nor is there any danger
of physical interference between two cable speakers attempting to share the
same channel. In light of these fundamental technological differences between
broadcast and cable transmission, application of the more relaxed standard of
scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when deter-
mining the First Amendment validity of cable regulation.
114 S. Ct. at 2457 (citations omitted); see also Justice Kennedy's opinion describing the
differences between broadcast and cable Part I, 114 S. Ct. 2445, text at notes 10-14 and
compare withJustice O'Connor's dissent describing the limits of cable capacity, id. at 2480.
51 See, e.g.,Judge Bazelon's breakthrough opinion in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469
F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (deciding health inspector's slip and fall case against one of Wash-
ington's most missed eateries involving greasy condition of metal stairs leading to kitchen's
barbecue pits). For general discussions of the evolution of modern negligence theory out
of rigid common law categories, see CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, CASES AND
MATERALS ON TORTS, ch. 6 (3d ed. 1977); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, TORTS, ch. 10, 1 62; S.F.C.
MILSOM, HIsToRIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw, chs. II & 13 (2d ed. 1969).
52 See Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469 F.2d at 100 n.10 (discussing harsh results of inflexible
tort classifications).
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three over-the-air channels to subscribers in any market; or direct
broadcast satellite services, which can provide over 150 channels of
satellite-delivered subscription video programming directly to
home viewers? All of these distribution technologies are providing
a functionally similar, look-a-like video service to subscribers, and
all of the services can expect innovations and regulatory changes to
affect the current limitations on their channel capacity. There may
be First Amendment grounds for distinctions, but a snapshot of the
channel capacity of each service at any point in time is not one of
them.
Turner also did not articulate a new approach for applying
First Amendment values to information age media. The opinion
does not reveal a grasp of the central fact of the modern communi-
cations era: different distribution technologies are interchangea-
ble. Once content is converted and transmitted in a digital format,
legal distinctions among different kinds of conduits become obso-
lete. The current balkanization of the marketplace into telephone,
broadcast, movie, cable, computer, newspaper, and a host of other
separate communication and information entities is a regulatory
hangover, not an incurable technological condition. The break-
down of increasingly inappropriate artificial barriers is well under-
way and will make even the notion of distinct telephone
companies, television companies, or computer companies out of
date-soon it will be easier simply to think of communications
companies that provide these various services through a variety of
different appliances. In the emerging multimedia age, it is time
for the Court to apply the First Amendment in a way that addresses
operators' and technology users' speech rights without being dis-
tracted by the nature of the technologies.53
If the Court fails to move toward a technology neutral First
Amendment analysis, the courts could increasingly issue decision
in conflict with the current efforts in Congress and the Executive
branch, including the independent FCC, to overhaul the existing
telecommunications laws. Recent proposals would regulate similar
services similarly regardless of the delivery technology, moving the
53 See Message in the Medium, supra note 15. The author rejects the current scarcity
based First Amendment jurisprudence for the electronic media as being inapplicable to
the forthcoming information superhighway. The author forecasts that the information
superhighway will allow virtually limitless channels. Id. at 1067. The Note proposes a non-
technology based First Amendment jurisprudence that depends on basic First Amendment
values. "Ultimately, regulation of the information superhighway should be premised on
the fundamental principle that the First Amendment protects messages, not media." Id. at
1083.
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regulatory focus from entities to services.54 .On the other hand, by
breaking out of the old molds the judiciary could have a powerful
complementary role in rationalizing outdated communications
laws,55 and enforcing fairness and First Amendment values when
reviewing the new telecommunications reform laws that Congress
surely will adopt eventually.56
Ironically, the courts indirectly are playing a role in overcom-
ing the inertia and political obstacles that have frustrated Con-
gress' and the Administration's efforts to rewrite current
communications laws. In fact, while focusing on Judge Harold
Green's long supervision of the AT&T consent decree as some-
thing of a cause celebre, there is a growing consensus that it is time
for Congress to take management of the communications business
out of thejudiciary's hands and put primary regulatory responsibil-
ity in the hands of an expert agency, the Federal Communications
Commission.57 A spate of recent judicial rulings is reinforcing this
momentum by highlighting the inadequacies of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.58
In one case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia ruled that the FCC could not require local exchange
companies, including the regional Bell operating companies, to
share their physical space with their competitors. 59 The FCC's so-
54 See, e.g., H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994).
55 The communications field might, or might not, provide some applications for Guido
Calabresi's theories about how courts can modernize statutorily petrified law. See GUIDO
CALABREsl, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (Harvard University Press 1982).
56 In the words of one of the principle sponsors of landmark telecommunications re-
form legislation, upon the failure to enact legislation in the 103d Congress, "this should
not be a wake, however, but a wake up call." Remarks of Representative EdwardJ. Markey,
Chairman, House Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee (Sept. 27, 1994). Both
the House and the Senate authors of the legislation intend to reintroduce their bills early
in 1995. See Statement of Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman, Senate Commerce Com-
mittee (Sept. 23, 1994); Ted Hearn, Telecomm Proponents Look Toward '95, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Oct. 3, 1994, at 3; see also Vice President Al Gore, Remarks at the Center for Commu-
nication (Oct. 17, 1994) (transcript on file with Cardozo Arts & Entertainment LawJournal).
Similarly, already the new Republican Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee has
already indicated he intends to press forward on comprehensive communications legisla-
tion early in 1995. See Remarks of Senator Pressler, supra note 19; Mike Mills, Pressler Wants
Phone, Cable Brakes Off WAsH. PosT, Nov. 16, 1994, at C2.
57 See, e.g., Remarks ofJohn Dingell, Chairman, House Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee, upon introduction of H.R. 3626, 140 CONG. REC. H10911 (Nov. 22, 1993 daily ed.);
Remarks of Representative EdwardJ. Markey, 140 CONG. REC. H5204 (June 28, 1994 daily
ed.); Remarks of Senator Ernest F. Hollings, upon introduction of S. 1822, 140 CONG. REC.
S771 (Feb. 3, 1994 daily ed.); Remarks of Senator John Breaux, 140 CONG. REc. S5686
(May 12, 1994 daily ed.). But see Remarks of Senator Robert Dole, 140 CONG. REc. S6770
(June 10, 1994) (in light of FCC cable rate regulations, Congress needs to espouse clear-
cut policy to avoid overregulation and fancy mechanisms).
58 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1988).
59 Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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called "co-location rules" were designed to encourage competition
in local telephone markets by giving new entrants to local tele-
phone service the right to pay to connect their networks to estab-
lished carriers' networks.60 The court did not rule on the policy,
but instead held that under the Communications Act of 1934 the
FCC does not have statutory authority to order this kind of inter-
connection of new competitors with established networks.61
Three other courts have ruled that the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984's ("1984 Cable Act")6" provision barring tele-
phone companies from providing cable television service in their
local service area is unconstitutional.63 There is broad, bipartisan
agreement in Congress, in the Administration, at the FCC, and
among commentators that it is time to allow the telephone compa-
nies to compete with cable over video services.64 The problem with
litigating this result case by case-aside from the enormous cost
and delay and uncertain signals sent to capital markets-is that a
court ruling merely invalidates the existing regulatory structure
without specifying terms and conditions for fair competition or en-
suring that telephone entry occurs in a way that promotes the pub-
lic interest. Promulgating such regulation clearly is Congress'
responsibility and role. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit even took the unusual step of urging Congress to repeal the
1984 Cable Act restriction on telephone entry into cable, refusing
to review Judge Ellis' decision in C&P until Congress did.65
The same week that the Fourth Circuit acted the Supreme
Court sent a similar message to Congress. The Court ruled 5-3 that
the FCC did not have the statutory authority to relieve AT&T's
smaller rivals in the long distance market of the need to file expen-
sive and unnecessary paperwork at the FCC.66 Justice Scalia wrote
that the FCC's policy "may well be a better regime, but it is not the
60 Id. at 1444.
61 Id. at 1446.
62 Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988)).
63 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994); BellSouth v.
United States, No. CV 93B2662-S (N.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1994).
64 The cable television industry has a different view, in that it has opposed every video
dialtone application at the FCC, filing opposition papers amounting to 33,000 pages, a
twelve foot high stack of paper, containing enough words that if the words were placed end
to end, they would reach from Washington, D.C. to Philadelphia. FCC Chairman, Reed E.
Hundt, Remarks at the Networked Economy Conference, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 26,
1994).
65 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. June
15, 1994).
66 MCI Telecomm. v. American Tel. & Tel., 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994).
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one that Congress established." 7 In other words, fix the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.
For many years, the-a-I would say the flower of the Bar, and the-
a-I would presume to add, the matured autumnal fruits of the Wool-
sack-have been lavished upon Jarndyce and Jarndyce. If the public
have the benefit, and if the country have the adornment, of this great
Grasp, it must be paid for in money or money's worth, sir.
Excuse me, our time presses. Do I understand that the whole estate is
found to have been absorbed in costs.8
Well, whatever the ultimate outcome in Must Carry litigation,
historic change is afoot. For over six decades, the model of the
regulated natural monopoly has dominated United States commu-
nications law and policy. Now all three branches of the federal
government are working in tandem, sometimes consciously, some-
times inadvertently, at legal changes that will replace the monopoly
model with a competition model. In the competition model, the
government's role becomes that of a referee, not a player or a
cheerleader. Markets are opened to multiple players from the pri-
vate sector who vigorously compete with each other. Playing the
game, rather than regulation, determines how business is con-
ducted and checks market power abuse.69 Congress' inability to
pass comprehensive telecommunications reform legislation has
delayed the advent of competition.
Without legislation the FCC and the courts will continue to
address many of the issues willy nilly. Congress can do much to
rationalize the existing legal framework and to streamline regula-
tory and judicial proceedings by making the tough policy choices
and enacting legislation. Turner type litigation, while inevitable, is
not the way to drive national telecommunications policy. When
Jarndyce learned that his case was over with the entire estate con-
sumed by litigation costs he remarked, "to have done with the suit
67 114 S. Ct. at 2233.
68 DICKENS, supra note 8, at 866-67.
69 Somewhat ironically, some note that the Keynesian economic model, including its
concept of "perfect competition," that has dominated the era of regulated monopoly has
given way to a more realistic model based on game theory. Peter Pasell, Game Theory Cap-
tures a Nobe4 N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1994, at DI; Will Hutton, Game Theorists Who Undermined
Free Market Win the Nobel Prize, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 12, 1994, at 15; David Warsh, Game
Theory Plays Strategic Role in Economics'Most Interesting Problems, CHICAGO TRIB.,July 24, 1994,
at 9; see generally ADAM M. BRANDENBURG AND BARRYJ. NALEBUFF, CRANGING THE GAME (Cur-
rency/Doubleday forthcoming 1994); AViNASH K. Dixrr AND BARRYJ. NALEBUFF, THINKING
STRATEGICALLY (W.W. Norton & Co. New York 1991).
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on any terms is a greater blessing that I had looked for. '70 Just so.
Must Carry litigation might prompt the same sentiments. Still, im-
portant First Amendment issues arising over new telecommunica-
tions laws will and should be before the Court. Congress soon will
be the engine for this change. It is up to the Court, as its First
Amendment treatment of new technology evolves, to supply the
constitutional guideposts.
70 Id. at 867.
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